Transactions of the American Philological Association 129 (1999) 13–41

Blind Rage and Eccentric Vision in *Iliad* 6*

Stephen Fineberg
Knox College

The *Iliad* opens with a quarrel in the Greek camp between Agamemnon and Achilles over the woman Briseis, who came into Achilles' hands as part of the spoils of war. Agamemnon demands Briseis back from Achilles, and Achilles objects that, if he is deprived of his just part of the spoils, no reason remains for him to continue fighting. The quarrel is about status.[1] Achilles has lost his prize, he is dishonored (ἄτιμος, *Il.* 1.171), and he withdraws to his tent. Because of Achilles' withdrawal, many Greeks die, including Patroclus, the companion whom Achilles most loves. It is this loss that Achilles mourns in the final book of the epic, in the company of Priam. As the poem draws to a close, Achilles and Priam share a common sense of grief, the former for Patroclus and the latter for his son Hector, whose body he had come in order to recover (*Il.* 24.509–12):

> τὼ δὲ μνησαμένω, ὁ μὲν Ἕκτορος ἀνδροφόνοιο
> κλαῖ' ἀδινὰ προπάροιθε ποδῶν Ἀχιλῆος ἐλυσθείς,
> αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς κλαῖεν ἑὸν πατέρ', ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε
> Πάτροκλον·
>
> And, as the two of them remembered, one wept in gasps for man-slaughtering Hector, crouching before the feet of Achilles, while Achilles himself wept for his own father and again for Patroclus.

The dual form (τὼ μνησαμένω) and the repetition of the verb that describes each man as he weeps (κλαῖεν, *Il.* 24.510 and 511) underscore the intimacy

*Except where explicitly noted, Greek is quoted from the Oxford Classical Texts: *Iliad* (Monro and Allen), *Odyssey* (Allen), *Homeric Hymns* (Allen), *Sophocles* (Lloyd-Jones and Wilson), and *Euripides* vol. III (Diggle). All translations, unless otherwise attributed, are my own. For valuable suggestions on this article in draft I am very grateful to Brenda Fineberg, Sarah Fineberg, Jonathan Lee, Bill Scott, and Tom Van Nortwick. I wish to thank John Haslem whose editorial skills led to substantial improvements in my exposition, and I am very much indebted to Marilyn Skinner as well to the anonymous referees for *TAPA* whose careful readings improved my work in any number of ways. Finally, I want to thank Douglas Parker who taught me to read Homer so many years ago.

[1]See below, p. 22 and n. 41.

between the two mourners and their shared loss. Thematically, then, the poem begins with anger over the loss of status and ends with memory, bereavement, and a grief that unites two enemies. The famous surrealism of the carnage in the poem's battle scenes and a preoccupation with personal status on both sides convey a sense of excess in the killing and, implicitly, in the honor the killing promises. Achilles thinks only of his own honor until the death of Patroclus calls him up short, and Hector, finally abandoning city and family, remains fixated upon his own renown until he himself dies at the hands of Achilles.

Within this thematic context, the meeting of the Greek Diomedes and the Trojan Glaucus in Book 6 stands out as an anomaly. Just as the two are about to engage in combat, they discover quite by chance that they are bound by ancient ties of guest-friendship (ξενία), a social institution based not on exhibitions of personal prowess but on a recognition of mutual vulnerability: one guest-friend takes in another who is far from home and without resources of his own.[2] Rather than proceeding to do battle, Diomedes and Glaucus reaffirm their ties of guest-friendship and commemorate those renewed ties by an exchange of armor. But the exchange is uneven, as Glaucus gives up gold armor for bronze. It is so inequitable, in fact, that Homer, in a rare editorial comment, says that Zeus must have taken Glaucus' wits away: ἔνθ' αὖτε Γλαύκῳ Κρονίδης φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεύς (*Il.* 6.234). Glaucus' apparent lapse in judgment has prompted a lively scholarly debate[3] concerning Zeus' motive for diminishing his mental faculties.

In the following pages, I will contribute to that debate by arguing that the reconciliation of Diomedes and Glaucus anticipates the tenuous union between Achilles and Priam at the end of the poem, and that Glaucus' loss of wits does not indicate a simple lack of judgment but an indifference to what gold stands for in the epic. Gold is the emblem of excess in the quest for honor that motivates both Greeks and Trojans throughout the poem. Glaucus' seeming lack of judgment, then, marks his departure from the normative values at Troy—a fundamental alteration in perspective. When he and Diomedes renew their ancient kinship ties in *Iliad* 6, they symbolically repair the damage

[2]Among the best general discussions of guest-friendship is still Finley 104–5, 107–8.

[3]For the bibliography on the exchange of armor in the Diomedes-Glaucus episode, see (in the order of publication): Wilcock, Craig, Gaisser, Anderson, Calder, Edwards 1987, Donlan, Traill, and Scodell. Their various arguments are addressed in the notes below, *passim*.

initially done by Paris to his host, Menelaus.[4] At the same time, they countermand, if for only a brief interlude, the quest for personal honor that leads Achilles to lose Patroclus and, more immediately in *Iliad* 6, induces Hector to abandon both his wife and his son.

To make my case, I will argue that, during the encounter between Diomedes and Glaucus in *Iliad* 6, there is mention of two sorts of madness that stand in thematic contrast to one another. The first, expressed in the verb μαίνεσθαι and its cognate μανία, conveys a sense of excessive aggression, while the second, represented in Glaucus' apparent lack of judgment, his loss of φρένες, connotes a deficiency rather than an active impulse. μαίνεσθαι appears most prominently in *Iliad* 6 as the epithet of the god Dionysus, the protagonist of a myth recounted by the Greek Diomedes to the Trojan Glaucus. Diomedes fails to recognize his opponent and, wanting to be certain, asks Glaucus whether he is divine or mortal. To illustrate the importance of this question, he tells Glaucus the tale of a mortal, Lycurgus, who attacked the god Dionysus and paid a terrible price. In that story Dionysus bears the epithet μαινομένοιο (*Il.* 6.132), the participial form of a verb that, in the epic at large, connotes a rage characteristic of gods and sometimes of mortals whom gods have incited. In Diomedes' tale, Dionysus is "the god of rage" because, while he himself shows no aggression, he provokes Lycurgus to attack him—an act that, as the consequences show, no sane man would knowingly commit. I will conclude that Glaucus' apparent loss of common sense is set in thematic contrast to the μανία of Lycurgus' assault on Dionysus. Lycurgus, in his madness, attacks a god and dies for his imprudence, while Glaucus' apparent loss of common sense ratifies a renewal of friendship between himself and one of the fiercest of his enemies.

In the light of this contrast between the madness (μανία) that marks Lycurgus' aggression and the derangement or loss of φρένες that accompanies the commemoration of a renewed friendship, an exchange of gold for bronze becomes more comprehensible. In the *Iliad*, gold stands as the emblem of a victory that Diomedes at first hopes to gain over Glaucus. Indifference to the value of gold implies the absence of that motive. Yet it is not as if honorable military conquest is being repudiated; what is rejected is only a quest for honor

[4]The presence of both Helen (*Il.* 6.323–24, 343–53), who in hindsight laments her past actions, and Paris, who is explicitly censured by Hector (*Il.* 6.284–85), suggests that the actions of Paris and Helen are indeed the implicit point of reference for the events of *Il.* 6.

that has become excessive. Above all, Achilles' anger toward Agamemnon and his withdrawal from battle exemplifies such excess. So, too, does Hector's decision to abandon his wife and child as he returns to battle in Book 6. Thus when Zeus takes Glaucus' wits away, he does so in the interests of redressing the excesses that have come to eclipse a sense of human attachment and mortal limit in the poem.

In the interests of clarity, I have divided the discussion that follows into six parts.

I. Μαίνεσθαι and Its Cognates. In part I, I survey the epic instances of μαίνεσθαι, on the one hand, and of the loss of φρένες, on the other, in order to establish the distinct meanings of those two states of mind in the Diomedes-Glaucus episode in *Iliad* 6.

II. Dionysus, the God Who Elicits μανία and Survives It. In part II, I argue that Dionysus has been recruited for his cameo appearance in Book 6 not merely because he is a god with the power to punish a mortal who assaults him, but because he is a god who presents himself as apparently helpless—he is portrayed in *Iliad* 6 as an infant.[5] The infant Dionysus, as I contend, is cast as part of a thematic matrix of vulnerable children in *Iliad* 6, all of whom except for Dionysus perish for want of an operative system of kinship ties. Lycurgus is punished, as Diomedes says, for attacking a god. The god's power, however, lies not in simple brute strength but in his kinship alliances. Like the mortal children who perish without the support of their kin, Glaucus himself is vulnerable before the superior might of Diomedes. Unlike those children, though, Glaucus is preserved by the

[5]It is not for a lack of knowledge of the god's biography that Homer all but excludes Dionysus from his epics. In the fourteenth book of the *Iliad* (325), Zeus boasts that he is the father of Dionysus, and he identifies Semele as Dionysus' mother. Dionysus' encounter with Lycurgus in *Il.* 6.130–40 is paradigmatic of the struggle for recognition among mortals that was to characterize Dionysus' later adventures. Homer's Dionysus is already associated with madness—he is μαινομένοιο (*Il.* 6.132)—and is alluded to as "the bringer of joy to mortals" (*Il.* 14.325), perhaps in allusion to his connection with wine. The nurses (τιθήνας, *Il.* 6.132) that attend Dionysus in *Il.* 6 may anticipate the band of women who follow the god in his maturity—they carry wands (θύσθλα, *Il.* 6.134), identified by some as the θύρσοι commonly wielded by maenads during the fifth century. See below, nn. 8 and 9. On the absence of Dionysus from Homeric epic, see Seaford 1994: 344–62; cf. Seaford 1993: 142, Guthrie 165, and Privitera 61. Dionysus is also mentioned in the *Odyssey*. In *Od.* 24.74, Dionysus is said to have presented Thetis with an amphora on the occasion of her wedding, and in *Od.* 11.325 he is implicated in the death of Ariadne. On Dionysus' gift to Thetis, see Schaus 119–28.

bonds of kinship he discovers between himself and his enemy. In the context of this argument, then, Dionysus is not just any god but specifically a vulnerable child protected by ties of kinship.

III. Glaucus, the Mortal Who Subverts μανία. Following the tale of Dionysus and Lycurgus, Glaucus replies to Diomedes' questions about his identity in a lengthy monologue. In part III, I argue that Glaucus' speech confirms the thematic importance of vulnerability and kinship. A close reading of Glaucus' narrative reveals as its central theme the frailty of the mortal race and, in addition, a means of transcending that condition. Transcendence, however, comes not through self-serving exhibitions of martial prowess, but through maintaining the primacy of the family and the community where the memory of honor is preserved. Families and communities, including the larger community defined by the institution of guest-friendship (ξενία), are grounded in the recognition of individual vulnerability. The community offers not merely physical protection but also a collective memory that honors its heroes. Glaucus' narrative affirms the inadequacy of a quest for honor without an equally firm commitment to the community that confers honor.

IV. The Restraint of Diomedes. Having thus made the case that kinship ties both safeguard Glaucus and Dionysus and preserve the memory of their actions, I maintain in part IV that a characteristic prudence in Diomedes complements the emphasis on Glaucus' vulnerability. Along with his willingness to reaffirm ties of guest-friendship with Glaucus, Diomedes' caution in *Iliad* 6 is a function of such prudence and implies a recognition of mortal vulnerability or limit. A look at Diomedes' actions elsewhere in the poem will reveal a prudent nature throughout and so contextualize the caution about fighting gods he shows in Book 6.

V. The Failure of Restraint in Hector. Diomedes' restraint in seeking honor and his reaffirmation of guest-friendship in *Iliad* 6 function in structural contrast, on the one hand, to the implicit indifference of Agamemnon to kinship ties and, on the other hand, to the detachment from everything other than a quest for honor that leads Hector to abandon his defense of the city and his family. In part V, a brief digression will be required to make this contrast clear.

VI. The Exchange of Gold Armor for Bronze. Finally, in part VI, I will return to the exchange of armor between Diomedes and Glaucus to argue

that the gold that Glaucus so unaccountably gives up for bronze is the emblem of excessive mortal ambition, ambition of a sort that isolates the individual from the community and entails terrible loss. I will first conclude that Glaucus' indifference to the value of gold is, in such terms, a fitting emblem of the reaffirmation of guest-friendship. Secondly, I will argue that, when he says Zeus has removed Glaucus' wits, Homer is in fact contrasting a sense of human fragility and limit revealed in Glaucus' narrative with the excessive ambition that leads Hector—no less than Achilles himself—to compromise the interests of his city and his closest human ties.

I. Μαίνεσθαι and Its Cognates

In epic usage, μαίνεσθαι marks a state of mind characteristic of gods and of mortals who rage beyond the bounds of proper mortal limit. Apart from Dionysus, gods rage seven times in the *Iliad*: Zeus, Athena, and Hera rage once apiece, while Ares rages four times.[6] The rage of Zeus, Athena, Hera, and Ares is in every case a destructive one. A clue to the essentially violent character of this rage may be drawn from the fact that it is Ares the war god who displays such an emotion most often. Among the warriors in the poem, only Achilles, Hector, and Diomedes rage, although Achilles expresses the hope that Patroclus will do so.[7] Achilles rages at *Iliad* 24.114 and at 135 where, "in his raging mind," (φρεσὶ μαινομένῃσιν) he incurs Zeus' censure for refusing to relinquish Hector's body. Hector rages in four passages (μαίνεται at *Il.* 8.355 and *Il.* 9.238; μαίνετο at *Il.* 21.5), once in explicit comparison with the god of war (μαίνετο at *Il.* 15.605). Diomedes' spear rages (μαίνεται) in *Iliad* 8.111 and does not rage (οὐ...μαίνεται) in *Iliad* 16.74–75. In *Iliad* 5.185, Diomedes himself rages (μαίνεται), "but not without the aid of some god," says Pandarus to Aeneas, while in *Iliad* 6.100–101 the Trojan seer Helenus remarks that it will take a god to end Diomedes' "excessive rage" (λίην μαίνεται).

[6]In *Il.* 8, Athena accuses Zeus of such rage (360), and Zeus, via Iris, makes the same accusation about Athena and Hera (413). Ares is so described four times (*Il.* 5.717 and 831; *Il.* 15.128 and 606), and Dionysus once (*Il.* 6.132). The *Odyssey* has only four occurrences of the verb, all describing the emotions of violent, uncivilized characters: the Cyclops (*Od.* 9.350), Ares (*Od.* 11.537), the suitors (*Od.* 18.406), and a wine-besotted centaur (*Od.* 21.298).

[7]The case of Patroclus is particular because, first, he does not in fact rage; Achilles only hopes he will. Secondly, Achilles' wish that his companion rage occurs at a point in the poem when Patroclus is about to stand in for Achilles himself (*Il.* 16.245).

Apart from Achilles, Hector, and Diomedes, the three most godlike of warriors in the poem, the only other mortals who rage are, curiously, Hector's wife Andromache, who becomes "like a woman possessed" (μαινομένῃ ἐϊκυῖα, *Il.* 6.389; cf. *Il.* 22.460) at reports of Hector's death, and Anteia, the wife of king Proetus, who, in Glaucus' narrative, develops an illicit and consuming passion (ἐπεμήνατο, *Il.* 6.160) for Bellerophon, a stranger temporarily under her roof. Both cases are extreme, setting the two women at odds with traditional notions of female behavior. Perhaps it is even suggested that they are divinely possessed: indeed, a good case has been made that the rage of these women anticipates the possession of Dionysus' maenads in later, post-Homeric texts.[8] Anteia has betrayed her husband and so her role as a wife, and Andromache has left the sphere that defines a woman's proper domain. When Hector fails to find Andromache in the house or in Athena's temple—both proper places for a female—a servant informs him that Andromache has gone to the city walls "like a woman possessed" (*Il.* 6.389). When at last Hector and Andromache meet at the wall, she advises him to defend the wall adjacent to a certain wild fig tree, for there, she says, is the place most vulnerable to attack (*Il.* 6.433–39). Hector sends her home, telling her to attend to her own tasks at the loom and to leave the war to men (*Il.* 6.490–93). Meeting as they do at the wall, Hector and Andromache, as Marilyn Arthur points out, are both outside their proper spheres, and in that liminal space they depart for a moment from the gendered roles that normally separate them. Hector removes his helmet, the emblem of

[8]Anteia's rage (ἐπεμήνατο, *Il.* 6.160) serves the queen's culpable designs on Bellerophon, and the compound in ἐπι- underscores the direction of her feeling toward her victim. Andromache's distress, in contrast, elicits compassion. By being cast as a comparison, her rage is accordingly softened; she is "like to a raging woman" (μαινομένῃ ἐϊκυῖα, *Il.* 6.389); cf. *Il.* 22, where she is again compared to a "raging woman" (μαινάδι ἴσῃ, 22.460). Seaford 1993: 116 with n. 5 notes that μαίνεσθαι, when it is applied to mortals, is usually descriptive of "raging warriors" and he explains its usage here of Andromache's frenzy by arguing that her frenzy is consistent with maenadism in tragedy, where maenads are regularly cast as hunters and warriors (see Segal 1971: 47–48, who suggests that μαινάδι ἴσῃ is a variation on δαίμονι ἶσος, frequently said of warriors in combat). As maenadic women assume such male roles, Seaford suggests, they negate the wedding ritual, and such negation is symbolically enacted by Andromache in *Il.* 6 and 22. Seaford's argument might be extended to cover the case of Anteia as well, whose adulterous passion for Bellerophon in *Il.* 6, if it does not enact a negative wedding ritual, does defy the proprieties of marriage. Cf. Arthur 30; Seaford 1994: 328–67; Segal 1971: 47; also Otto 54.

his military identity, and Andromache advises Hector about war, which Hector, as he puts his helmet back on, specifies as men's work.[9]

μαίνεσθαι, then, is often used of divine rage and sometimes of mortal rage comparable to that of a god or inspired by a god. Even where mortal rage is not explicitly linked to that of a god, its special character is nonetheless suggested by the fact that it is restricted to the three most exceptional warriors in the poem, and to women who, in different ways, break the mold that defines a woman's role in the proper epic order of things. What characterizes those who rage, then, is the exceptional, often excessive, nature of the emotion, a state of mind that is more than mortal and beyond the limits proper to mortals: gods, excessively aggressive warriors, and women marked by excessive (perhaps even divinely inspired) frenzy.

Unlike all the others, mortal and divine, who rage, Dionysus, although he bears the epithet μαινομένοιο (*Il.* 6.132), shows neither aggression nor excess in *Iliad* 6. In Diomedes' tale, it is, in fact, king Lycurgus who attacks the infant Dionysus, while Dionysus himself neither resists nor shows anger, but merely flees. In Sophocles' treatment of the myth, it is explicitly Lycurgus who rages (*Ant.* 959–61):

> οὕτω τᾶς μανίας δεινὸν ἀποστάζει
> ἀνθηρόν τε μένος. κεῖνος ἐπέγνω μανίαις
> ψαύων τὸν θεὸν ἐν κερτομίοις γλώσσαις.
>
> Thus the terrible and exuberant strength of his madness
> (μανίας) passed away, and [Lycurgus] knew the god whom
> he, during his madness (μανίαις), had assaulted with abusive tongue.

[9]Arthur 19–44; see esp. p. 31. See also Seaford 1993: 115–46. "The near absence of the polis from Homer entails the near absence of the contradiction between polis and household..." (145–46). Yet in this scene between Hector and Andromache, that conflict, Seaford argues, is thematic, and it is that theme that accounts for the rare reference to a "Dionysiac metaphor" in the epic. Andromache's frenzy in *Il.* 6 and 22, in Seaford's view, is maenadism, because her behavior shows definitive characteristics of the maenad found in contexts of tension between the socially defined spheres that separate men from women, especially in tragedy. "Out of her concern for the household, which contrasts and conflicts with Hector's sense of public duty,...[the Homeric] Andromache threatens to confuse, spatially and functionally, the gender division of the polis." (137). Andromache's actions in *Il.* 6 and 22, Seaford argues, dramatize a confusion of categories between the male and the female spheres and thus evoke the "Dionysiac metaphor." Cf. Seaford 1994: 330–38.

Just as warriors on the field of Troy rage because gods sanction or inspire them, so Lycurgus in *Iliad* 6, as in Sophocles' version of the story, is mad—he attacks a god.[10] The epithet μαινόμενος describes Dionysus because he inspires rage in Lycurgus, and Dionysus becomes not simply "the god of rage," but more explicitly, "the god who inspires rage" (μανία).[11] In later texts, Dionysus rages no less forcefully than does Ares;[12] his victims are inspired with a madness no less violent than that of Achilles, Hector, or Diomedes under the influence of Ares. So, too, in *Iliad* 6 the god has not been entirely dissociated from the anger he inspires; that anger has simply been displaced to Zeus and the other Olympians who avenge Dionysus at the conclusion of Homer's account.[13]

If some quality of excess defines μαίνεσθαι, the man who has lost his φρένες is, by contrast, in a diminished state. His temper has not been kindled to a rage or frenzy; rather his wits have been dulled. "What god," asks one warrior of another (*Il.* 17.469–70), "has put bad counsel in your breast, and removed your good judgment?" (φρένας). As in the Lycurgus story (*Il.* 6.234) and in the

[10]This translation takes μανίαις with ψαύων, which will mean that Lycurgus' assault on Dionysus was *an expression of* his madness, i.e., Lycurgus was mad to provoke the god. The other possibility is that μανίαις goes with ἐπέγνω, in which case the madness was a punishment for the assault, "He came to know the god in his madness," i.e., *because* Dionysus drove him mad. I follow the commentators who favor the association of μανίαις with ψαύων; see Jebb 172–73; Kamerbeek 166–67; and Lloyd-Jones who translates in the Loeb *Sophocles* (91): "He learned too late that he was mad in laying hands on the god, with mocking tongue." There is no assurance, of course, that, merely because Sophocles later associates madness with the god's victim rather than the god himself, Homer did so. Sophocles' version, however, does at least endorse the plausibility of such a reading of Homer's story.

[11]Henrichs 41–47 argues that Homer's Dionysus is called μαινομένοιο because the god mirrors the state of his victim. The god is a "projection," says Henrichs, of the characteristics of both his frenzied bacchants and their helpless victims.

[12]Early in the tradition, Dionysus himself was driven mad by Hera (E. *Cyc.* 3; Pl. *Lg.* 672b). For a full summary of the evidence including representations on the vases, see Carpenter 1997: 35–40.

[13]The vase evidence shows Dionysus walking or even seated and extending his vine-wand at arm's length. In one case (Cracow 1225), Lycurgus himself is shown in a fit of madness attacking his own family (a later addition to, or an alternative version of, the Homeric account). See Carpenter 1993: *passim* and Carpenter 1997: 40–41. Deutsch 39–41, discussing the rage of Dionysus himself in Euripides' *Bacchae*, stresses the identification between Zeus and his son Dionysus, noting that Dionysus, at the moment of his violent revenge against Pentheus, calls himself Zeus. If Deutsch's reading is compared to the tales told in *Il.* 6, consistency emerges: Zeus, in one case directly and in the other case metaphorically, avenges his son.

case of divine intervention at *Iliad* 17.470, good judgment is replaced with bad. So again in *Iliad* 19 (134–38), where Agamemnon apologizes to Achilles for his bad judgment by saying that Zeus took away his wits. Here the removal of the φρένες is explicitly attended by a case of ἄτη, dullness of mind (*Il.* 19.136–37), which in Agamemnon's case clouded his better judgment.[14]

II. Dionysus, the God Who Elicits μανία and Survives It

Linguistically, then, in *Iliad* 6 the rage (μανία) that Dionysus inspires is clearly distinct from the dullness of mind that Zeus seems to have imposed on Glaucus. The contrast between the active rage connoted by μαίνεσθαι and the passive derangement that results from a loss of the φρένες becomes problematic, however, in the case of Dionysus in Book 6. While Dionysus inspires rage like that of gods, his portrayal in *Iliad* 6 is, as previously noted, unlike that of any other god insofar as he is initially the passive victim of the very rage he provokes. It is Zeus and his fellow Olympians, not Dionysus, who display anger and subsequently lay violent hands on Lycurgus. The first step toward explaining the thematic importance of this anomaly lies in the recognition that the figure of Dionysus, an infant who cannot defend himself, appears within a matrix of other accounts of vulnerable children in *Iliad* 6.

In the tale that Diomedes tells, Dionysus is an infant among his nurses whom the Thracian king, Lycurgus, drives from Mount Nysa into the sea, where they find refuge among the Ocean nymphs.[15] When Lycurgus' actions evoke the anger of Zeus, Dionysus' father, and the rest of the Olympians, Lycurgus is afflicted first with blindness and then death. In *Iliad* 6, the protection that Dionysus receives from his father and the rest of the gods is implicitly set in thematic contrast to other mortal children in the book who are utterly defenseless and thus slated to perish at the hands of their enemies. The first of

[14]The richest discussion of Homeric ἄτη is that of Wyatt, who concludes that ἄτη contains an inherent notion of excess, with etymological origins in the notion of excessive eating! Cf. the more recent monograph by Doyle 7–22, and also the discussion by Onians 13–14 (who refers to *Il.* 8.111, 413). *Il.* 15.128–29 seems to present a case in which μαίνεσθαι and the absence of φρένες are equated. There Athena chastises Ares: μαινόμενε, φρένας ἠλέ, διέφθορας, "madman, deranged in mind, you might as well be dead!" (διέφθορας, from the verb διαφθείρειν, means literally "to perish"). Loss of φρένες and μανία, the two states of madness, may not be mutually exclusive, but that does not mean that they are the same.

[15]Among the Oceanids who receive Dionysus is Thetis. She also comforted Achilles when his adversary, Agamemnon, drove him into seclusion in *Il.* 1. Both Achilles and Dionysus, fleeing a conflict with male authority, retreat in effect to the women's quarters.

these images occurs early in the book when, following a brief narrative (*Il.* 6.1–36) in which Greek warriors kill a series of Trojans,[16] Menelaus captures the Trojan Adrastus. Adrastus pleads with Menelaus to spare him, assuring him that Menelaus will collect a ransom from his wealthy father. Menelaus is on the point of acceding when Agamemnon rushes up and dissuades him, calling Menelaus soft-hearted and reminding him that no Trojan ever did him a kindness in his house, doubtless alluding to Paris. Let no Trojan escape death, urges Agamemnon, not even the male child in its mother's womb (*Il.* 6.58–59). Agamemnon changes his brother's mind and Menelaus kills his captive. Adrastus' father cannot protect his son. The Trojan's vulnerability becomes all the more emphatic by its juxtaposition to the violent killings that open the book and by its association with Agamemnon's cruel suggestion that even the male child in its mother's womb should die.

As if to balance the figure of the ill-fated Adrastus and the image of the helpless Trojan infant in its mother's womb, the poet introduces another image of a vulnerable child toward the end of Book 6. There, Hector, who has returned temporarily to the city, enjoys a brief reunion with his wife, Andromache, and their infant son, Astyanax (*Il.* 6.390–493). When Andromache pleads with Hector not to return to the battle, but to remain instead at the gates of the city in order to defend it, Hector will not comply. He knows in his heart, he says, that the city is destined to fall. He even envisions the indignity that will befall Andromache when the city does fall, and he prays he may be dead and buried before the bitter end (*Il.* 6.448–65). Thus fatalistic, Hector sees no point in defending the city, seeking instead all that he considers left to him, κλέος, the personal renown that he can still win in battle.

The terror that Astyanax exhibits as Hector removes his helmet (*Il.* 6.467–70)—perhaps it is the helmet's gleam that startles the infant—highlights the vulnerability of childhood in the midst of war and, at the same time, calls into question Hector's decision to return to battle. The child's fear is, of course, groundless because the helmet is in no immediate sense a threat, and indeed Astyanax's fright evokes gentle laughter from both Hector and Andromache. The helmet, however, is a reminder of Hector's ambitions, which will finally

[16]That the victors are all Greeks (in cases where they cannot be readily recognized as such) may be verified from other contexts in the poem, especially the catalogue of ships in Book 2.

cause him to leave his son and wife defenseless.[17] Despite the warmth of this intimate family scene, no reader or listener would have been unaware of Astyanax's ultimate fate. Hector himself foreshadows it when he expresses his certainty that Troy will fall (*Il.* 6.448–49).[18] While it displays the love of Hector for his family, the tenderness of the episode is no more than a momentary respite from loss; in fact, this scene of family intimacy heightens the pathos of what is to come. As Adrastus' vulnerability is underscored by an image of the helpless child in its Trojan mother's womb, Astyanax's helplessness is similarly dramatized—by his actual infancy, by the images that Andromache conjures up of her own death and her orphaned son (*Il.* 6.407–11, 432), and by Hector's own conviction that the city will fall. Like Menelaus' captive Adrastus, who stands beyond the reach of his father's help, Hector's son can expect no protection from his father, who has chosen to pursue his own personal glory and leave his family to their fate.[19]

The image of the Trojan child who will perish in its mother's womb and the figure of the fearful Astyanax, counterpart of that other child, who will one day fall victim to the conquering Greeks—these establish a thematic context of vulnerable children. The infant Dionysus is another vulnerable child, yet he is distinct from the others, for he will not die but, in the end, triumph (*Il.* 6.130–43). Granted, a god enjoys such exemption from death; but Dionysus is not just any god. He is uniquely marked by his apparent vulnerability. Unlike the parent of any other Olympian, Dionysus' mother is mortal; in later accounts he himself is regularly persecuted by mortals who fail to recognize his divinity. Dionysus falls prey to Cretan pirates who seize him for ransom. His arrival is greeted with hostility by king Pentheus of Thebes, by the daughters of Proetus at Argos, and by the daughters of Minyas at Orchomenus; and his priest, Icarius, is killed by

[17]Although he does not condemn Hector's motives, Owen 53 and 63–64 sees a similar significance in the helmet and reads the laughter of Hector and Andromache as I do. While he regards Andromache in *Il.* 6 as realistic about the future, Segal 1971: 33–57 (esp. p. 56) finds her unrealistic in *Il.* 22 because she is unable to relinquish her hopes for a future that plainly can not be realized.

[18]The death of Astyanax was a popular theme on painted Attic vases beginning in the mid-sixth century (e.g., Lydus' black amphora—Berlin F 1685; *ABV* 109.24) and persisting until about the mid-fifth century (e.g., the Kleophrades Painter's hydria—Naples 2422; *ARV* 189.74).

[19]Lee 121 finds a contrast between Agamemnon's "brutal attitudes" in this scene and "those of the human Hector." While I agree with this contrast, I do not fully share Lee's generous assessment of Hector (cf. below, pp. 19–22)

the early dwellers of Attica who feared the effects of the god's wine.[20] At *Bacchae* 441 and 453, he is explicitly addressed as ξένε, but there the term means merely "stranger," for the god is unrecognized both as a divinity and as kin, and therefore unwelcome.

In sum, Dionysus, who embodies a certain vulnerability by very definition, survives with the help of his kin in *Iliad* 6, while the mortal children, who are beyond the help of their fathers, perish. If all that were required were an example of a god who ought not to be attacked, Diomedes could easily have mentioned his own recent encounter with Apollo; but Dionysus, because of his vulnerability and his Olympian family affiliations, is a uniquely apt parallel to Glaucus, whose kinship ties save him from Diomedes. Indeed, Diomedes himself implicitly links Glaucus to the other young people Adrastus and Astyanax who perish at Troy when he boasts in his initial eagerness to slay Glaucus: δυστήνων δέ τε παῖδες ἐμῷ μένει ἀντιόωσιν, "wretched are those whose children face my might" (*Il.* 6.127). Thus, these opposing images of children whose kin either can not or will not come to their aid, and Dionysus, whose father and fellow Olympians do not desert him, provide the thematic backdrop for the renewal of guest-friendship between Diomedes and Glaucus.

III. Glaucus, the Mortal Who Subverts μανία

The theme of vulnerability so systematically constructed through the imagery of Book 6 is developed further in the famous soliloquy where Glaucus replies to Diomedes' question about his identity. Glaucus begins with a question of his own: τί ἢ γενεὴν ἐρεείνεις; (*Il.* 6.145). "Why," he inquires, "do you ask of my generation?" Without waiting for an answer, however, Glaucus affirms his

[20]For the capture of Dionysus by the pirates, see the *Homeric Hymn to Dionysus* (*h.* VII); the encounter between Dionysus and Pentheus is chronicled in Euripides' *Bacchae*; the earliest reference to the punishment of the daughters of Proetus is in Hesiod's *Eoiai* (fr. 18 Loeb [169] = fr. 131 Merkelbach-West). The murder of Icarius parallels the tales of the god's rejection, but the punishment of his murderers seems to have been something other than madness (the earliest source is Σ to *Il.* 22.29; cf. Hyg. *Fab.* 130; Apollod. 3.191–92). Visual representations place the capture of Dionysus by the pirates as early as the sixth century (see Exekias' famous kylix in Munich; cf. the fourth century Lysikrates monument in Athens that depicts the pirates, already half transformed into dolphins, leaping in terror over the side of the ship). Euphronios' psykter, dating to about 515 B.C.E. (Boston 10.221), documents the early currency of the Pentheus story in Athens. A red figure pelike fragment by the Pan Painter (Getty 81.AE.62) may represent Icarius receiving the vine from Dionysus (see Robertson 143–44) and so confirm a place for this myth in fifth-century Athens. On his antagonists' failure to recognize Dionysus' divinity see below, n. 52.

willingness to comply: εἰ δ' ἐθέλεις καὶ ταῦτα δαήμεναι ὄφρ' ἐῢ εἰδῇς / ἡμετέρην γενεήν, πολλοὶ δέ μιν ἄνδρες ἴσασιν, "if you wish to learn these things as well, so that you may know my genealogy—(for) many people know it" (*Il.* 6.150–51). "Many people know Glaucus' genealogy," says Glaucus, implying that Diomedes should too, and Glaucus proceeds to tell him. Between Glaucus' initial question, "Why do you ask of my lineage," and his expression of willingness to recount it, however, Glaucus inserts his famous, though seemingly irrelevant, digression on the term γενεή (*Il.* 6.145–52):

> Τυδείδη μεγάθυμε, τί ἣ γενεὴν ἐρεείνεις;
> οἵη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν.
> φύλλα τὰ μέν τ' ἄνεμος χαμάδις χέει, ἄλλα δέ θ' ὕλη
> τηλεθόωσα φύει, ἔαρος δ' ἐπιγίγνεται ὥρη·
> ὣς ἀνδρῶν γενεὴ ἣ μὲν φύει ἣ δ' ἀπολήγει.
> εἰ δ' ἐθέλεις καὶ ταῦτα δαήμεναι, ὄφρ' ἐῢ εἰδῇς
> ἡμετέρην γενεήν, πολλοὶ δέ μιν ἄνδρες ἴσασιν·
> ἔστι πόλις...
>
> Why ask of my generation? Just like the generation of leaves, so is that of men. The wind scatters the leaves on the ground, and then the forest in bloom bears others, and they come into being in the spring. Thus one generation of men comes to be and another perishes. But if you wish to learn these things as well, so that you may know my genealogy—many people know it—there is a city...

A lengthy family history follows, and, in the course of that narrative, a clearer understanding of the importance of Glaucus' famous comparison between mortal men and the ephemeral generations of leaves emerges.

Standing before Diomedes, the man who has just sent two gods wounded from the field in Book 5, Glaucus seems little more than an autumn leaf in a bitter wind. This vulnerability is underscored in the story of his ancestor Bellerophon that lies at the heart of the genealogy. Bellerophon, although he seems to have possessed every human virtue, suffered unaccountably. He was the victim of a queen's illicit passion (*Il.* 6.160–62) and a king's unjust anger (*Il.* 6.166–70). Finally he suffered, for no apparent cause, the anger of the gods—Ares killed his son and Artemis killed his daughter (*Il.* 6.200–205). Only one child survived, who was to became the father of Glaucus. There is nothing in Glaucus' account to suggest that Bellerophon merited his fate. Glaucus only praises Bellerophon's virtue. Bellerophon's life-history depicts the futility of human existence in terms even bleaker than those found in the opening of

Glaucus' digression on γενεή: every individual perishes, and even what that person values most is subject to both human and divine caprice.[21]

Men and leaves, however, are not the same. Men are conscious of their mortality; while it is a source of pain, that consciousness also offers a measure of solace, for in consciousness is memory. The reputations of individual family members survive beyond the biological life of each individual. In those terms Glaucus answers his own opening question: it is needless to ask of his lineage, because everyone knows it (*Il.* 6.152)[22]—or at least in a better world everyone *would* know it. In the *Iliad*, where the quest for fame is paramount, memory is ironically at risk. Diomedes does not know Glaucus' history. He must be told.

In Glaucus' narrative, memory, which distinguishes men from leaves, enlarges the definition of γενεή. "Generation," γενεή, frames his speech: the word occurs five times, including those in the first and last lines.[23] At the opening of Glaucus' lecture (*Il.* 6.145), γενεή refers to the biological cycle of death and renewal, but, by the end of the speech, biological descent has been distinguished from αἵμα, "blood" (*Il.* 6.211): "I boast," says Glaucus, "that I am of such a family (ταύτης...γενεῆς, *Il.* 6.211) *and also* of such blood (αἵματος, *Il.* 6.211). By the end of the recitation, γενεή has become a total matrix in which a record of names, deeds, and relationships is preserved. Γενεή

[21]Gaisser 165–76 reads the Diomedes-Glaucus encounter (focusing on the Bellerophon myth) as a statement of mortal helplessness before the gods. Cf. Scodel 73–84, Anderson 95–110, and Lowry *passim*.

[22]Edwards 1987: 203 points out that the comparison between leaves and men appears elsewhere in contexts that have nothing to do with the everlasting regeneration of the species, but only with the lamentable death of its members. At *Il.* 21.464–66, for example, the race of mortals who perish like the generations of leaves is insignificant in comparison to the gods who live forever. Cf. Lowry 199, who observes that leaves outside of Glaucus' speech function as "less a symbol of mortality or transience than [simply] of vast number or general movement." Sider 263–82 argues that Simonides (frs. 19 and 20 West) takes Mimnermus to task for using Homer's image merely to lament the brevity of mortal life. Simonides, Sider argues, had read Homer's image in the way I am now reading it, as a statement of mortal frailty followed by an affirmation of the power of poetry to immortalize heroic deeds and thus mitigate the brevity of mortal life. Edwards 1987: 202–3, 204–6 notes that Glaucus' assertion that his lineage is well known is a formula paralleled elsewhere.

[23]Add to these γένος (*Il.* 6.209) and the verbs which mean "to give birth to" or "to be born": γύειν, τίκτειν, and γίγνεσθαι.

is no longer merely the physical family, but also the memory and those narratives that link the past and the present.[24]

In Glaucus' conception, however, deeds worthy of memory are in themselves not enough. Toward the end of his genealogy, when Glaucus mentions the ambitions that guide him at Troy, he speaks of present actions not simply in terms of the preeminence they will bring him but rather with reference to the honor they will give his ancestors (*Il.* 6.206–9):

> Ἱππόλοχος δέ μ' ἔτικτε...
> ...καὶ μοι μάλα πόλλ' ἐπέτελλεν
> αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων,
> μηδὲ γένος πατέρων αἰσχυνέμεν....
>
> Hippolochus sired me...and he enjoined me always to be brave and preeminent among the rest, and not to bring shame upon the race of my fathers (γένος πατέρων).

In Book 6, Hector too grounds his pursuit of honor upon his sense of shame before his fellow citizens and in the heroic ethos on which he was brought up by his father (*Il.* 6.440–46). However, Glaucus' narrative distinguishes his sense of community from Hector's, for the tale of Bellerophon's ultimate helplessness (a parallel to Glaucus' own vulnerability) calls into question the sufficiency of heroism alone. For all his heroism, Bellerophon is left, in Glaucus' account, to wander the earth, aimless in the wake of his unaccountable losses. In response to Glaucus, and as if to step back in time and rescue Bellerophon, Diomedes recalls that Oeneus, his own ancestor, took Bellerophon in as a guest and befriended him. Although no explicit narrative connection joins Bellerophon's wanderings with the welcome he received from Oeneus, the poetic logic of the juxtaposition suggests a connection. As Oeneus once secured Bellerophon, Diomedes will now secure Glaucus.

At Troy, on the other hand, where Paris' treachery and the conditions of war have rendered guest-friendship and the compassion upon which it rests inoperative, Hector can hope for no comfort in his loss; there will be no Oeneus to take him in. Equally, however, Hector's decision to leave the city to its fate

[24]Edwards 1987: 204 remarks on the two senses of the word γενεή, "descent" and "generation," that is, the family tree as opposed to the processes of biological reproduction. Cf. Nagy 178 n. 1, who suggests a distinction between γενεή, "complete ancestry," and γένος, "immediate ancestry." Nagy cites Meullner 77.

does nothing to repair the damage. In the poetic matrix of *Iliad* 6, constructed as it is upon images of helpless children, it is difficult to ignore the fact that Hector abandons not one but two dependents, his son and Andromache, to whom he is, in her own words, not only husband, but father and mother as well (*Il.* 6.429–30). In leaving Astyanax and Andromache, Hector in effect divorces himself from all kinship ties and from the community that will honor his memory.

IV. The Restraint of Diomedes

Glaucus' vulnerability and the close family ties that lay the ground for a renewal of guest-friendship find their complement in the characteristic moderation that leads Diomedes to hesitate before rushing upon his enemy, for, without Diomedes' caution, the value Glaucus places on family ties and the human weakness they alleviate would be for naught. Eager to attack Glaucus, but for a moment restrained by caution, Diomedes asks Glaucus who he is. At the moment when the two warriors first meet, Glaucus has been mentioned only once before (*Il.* 2.876), and Diomedes is apparently as unfamiliar with him as is Homer's audience. Diomedes asks: "Who are you, sir, among mortal human kind (καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων)?" (*Il.* 6.123). He is afraid that Glaucus may be a god (*Il.* 6.128–29). Under Athena's protection, Diomedes had fought Aphrodite and Ares in Book 5, but backed off from the fearsome Apollo who warned him not to go too far (*Il.* 5.436–44). Not only has Athena herself withdrawn in Book 6 (*Il.* 6.1), but Diomedes seems to have lost the gift of distinguishing mortal from immortal that she had given him (*Il.* 5.127–32).

The caution Diomedes displays upon meeting Glaucus in *Iliad* 6, however, is but one manifestation of a firm but moderate restraint shown by Diomedes throughout the epic. Although young and regularly slow to assert his views, Diomedes earns approbation on several occasions for his prudent counsel. Mark Edwards enumerates the relevant instances,[25] noting in particular the weight of Diomedes' words in public assemblies (*Il.* 7.399–404, 9.696–711, 14.109–33, and 9.30–59), where even Nestor praises the soundness of his judgment. Diomedes' restraint is demonstrated on one occasion when he endures unjust criticism because he deems it in the common interest to do so (*Il.* 4.364–418). He is not restrained, however, because he has any fear of speaking his mind, for, when he does not approve of his king's actions at another point (*Il.* 9.30–59), he does not hesitate to take issue with them. Indeed, he seizes the

[25]Edwards 1987: 217; cf. 206, 231, and 246.

opportunity to refute Agamemnon's earlier charge of cowardice against him.[26] Even when Diomedes attacks Ares and Aphrodite in Book 5, he does so only with Athena's endorsement (*Il.* 5.127–32, 826–28).[27]

Diomedes is a man of action tempered by restraint. He seems to know when to fight and when to put force aside. The virtue of heroic action in battle is not rejected in his decision to honor ties of guest-friendship—there are other Trojans for Diomedes to fight, as he tells Glaucus, and he leaves little doubt he will fight them. What is rejected is the sort of excessive heroic ambition that led Achilles into circumstances that will cause the loss of Patroclus, and, in the immediate context of Book 6, will lead Hector to abandon his vulnerable family. Throughout the epic, Diomedes is seen as a warrior second only to Achilles, but, unlike Achilles, he speaks always with moderation—a restraint that allows him to achieve a broader vision in *Iliad* 6. The very terms in which Diomedes inquires into Glaucus' identity are noteworthy, for, although the expression καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων (*Il.* 6.123) is common in the *Odyssey*, it does not occur elsewhere in the *Iliad*. This choice of terms for human beings forecasts the shift from a view of men as mere enemies to conquer to a broader perspective that speaks in generic terms of human kind.[28] Prior to Glaucus' soliloquy, Diomedes is eager to win honor by killing him, but after Glaucus has spoken, Diomedes is moved to recall his own childhood and the loss of his father (*Il.* 6.222–23):

> Τυδέα δ' οὐ μέμνημαι, ἐπεί μ' ἔτι τυτθὸν ἐόντα
> κάλλιφ', ὅτ' ἐν Θήβῃσιν ἀπώλετο λαὸς Ἀχαιῶν.
>
> I do not remember Tydeus, since he left me when I was still an infant,
> that time when the Achaian host perished at Thebes.

With this recollection of his own fatherless childhood, Diomedes establishes himself as part of the matrix of images of vulnerable children in the book. As he

[26]At *Il.* 9.34–36, Diomedes explicitly refers to the king's earlier accusation (4.364–75).

[27]Athena herself, of course, embodies prudent restraint (for example, *Il.* 1.187–214). The restraint of Diomedes is emphasized by contrasting him with other mortals who attacked gods. As Dione tells the wounded Aphrodite, two giants bound Ares and confined him to a bronze jar where he was in danger of perishing, and Heracles, it seems, once shot Hera in the breast, and also shot Hades with a barbed arrow, causing both divinities pain they could not repress. Placed in a class with giants and mythic heroes, Diomedes is made to stand out as all the more dramatic in his cautious restraint.

[28]See Benardete 1955: 49–52 (= Benardete [Summer 1985] 91); cf. Anderson 97.

does, his initial eagerness, prior to hearing Glaucus' narrative, to destroy Glaucus and make wretched the parents of children who face his might (*Il.* 6.127) vanishes. Diomedes' self-restraint, prompted by the memory of his own fatherless childhood, is a prelude to his reaffirmation of ξενία.

V. The Failure of Restraint in Hector

The force of Diomedes' transformation from a warrior who eagerly assaults the helpless children of his enemies to a man whose thoughts turn to his own orphaned condition and to a renewal of ξενία is underscored in Book 6, where Diomedes' compassion is contrasted with Agamemnon's cruelty on the one hand and Hector's abandonment of his family on the other.

It requires no argument to affirm that the renewal of ξενία by Diomedes and Glaucus is distinct from the vengeful cruelty of Agamemnon toward Menelaus' captive. Against Menelaus' humane instincts, Agamemnon condemns Adrastus. What is more, Agamemnon wishes not only to kill the children of Troy but to condemn them to be ἀκήδεστοι καὶ ἄφαντοι, "unmourned and unmarked" (*Il.* 6.60). To lie thus unmourned in unmarked tombs destroys the social ties by which the community preserves the names of its heroes—for even in war the dead are honored and corpses are surrendered under a flag of truce.[29] Agamemnon is not merely cruel; he places Adrastus beyond the help of kin and even cuts off the Trojan children from access to communal memory. Agamemnon offers a clear antithesis to Diomedes. It will require a brief digression, however, to distinguish Hector from Diomedes, because Hector himself is a genuinely sympathetic figure whose love for his son and wife is obviously sincere. Yet Hector's motives are culpable.

While Hector shows none of Agamemnon's cruelty, there is a hollowness in Hector's decision in *Iliad* 6 to abandon his defenseless family to their fate even if that fate is inevitable. Hector's liability to blame is revealed in a number of conflicting currents that run through the passage. When Hector takes up his son in his arms and prays to Zeus and the other gods that Astyanax may prove as preeminent in bravery as his father (*Il.* 6.476–78) and one day rule over Ilium, we feel a contradiction. Hector has just spoken of his city's impending destruction. As if to confirm that vision, the child's unhappy future is poetically foreshadowed in the pathos of Andromache's tears, in Hector's reluctance to

[29]See, for example, *Il.* 7.394–97.

depart, and, above all, in the terror Astyanax displays at the sight of his father's helmet (*Il.* 6.467–70). Even though Troy must fall and every male Trojan, including Hector himself, must die, his choice denies the bonds that mortals share while they live. When he has gone, accordingly, Andromache and her attendants lament Hector as if he were already dead, or, in Homer's words, "even though he was still alive" (*Il.* 6.500).[30] The thematic contrast in the choice confronting Hector is between the competitive struggle for personal honor and the human bonds that sustain community. Andromache accuses Hector of lacking pity for her and their son (οὐδ' ἐλεαίρεις, *Il.* 6.407; cf. 431). His very strength, she says, destroys him: φθίσει σε τὸ σὸν μένος (*Il.* 6.407). In fact, Hector is not immune to pity (*Il.* 6.484), but the image he holds of himself among the Trojans (αἰδέομαι, *Il.* 6.442) and his quest for honor (κλέος, *Il.* 6.446) assume an ever greater hold on him as the epic progresses.

The flaw in Hector revealed when he decides to ignore Andromache and seek his own honor rather than remain close to the city to protect his wife and their child to the last appears more fully developed in Books 18–22.[31] In Book 18, the Trojans hold an assembly. There Polydamas, a man conspicuous for his especially sound judgment (*Il.* 18.313; cf. 18.250), urges Hector to remain in the city, and Hector, characterized in explicit contrast to Polydamas as a man of action not words (*Il.* 18.252), responds in anger. Hector rejects Polydamas' advice and affirms his eagerness for renown (κῦδος, 18.294). Homer calls Hector's words a "council of evil" (κακά, 18.312).[32] In time, Hector recognizes his recklessness and expresses regret that he failed to heed Polydamas' advice

[30]As Andromache mourns for Hector as if he were already dead, so Hector himself, preparing to leave Andromache and Astyanax behind, already envisions his city—his community—in ruins.

[31]Redfield 113–27, who understands Hector's decision to return to the fray as a necessary corollary of his role as citizen and warrior, argues that it is not a flaw in Hector's nature but a necessary consequence of the ironic and tragic contradiction between the demands of the city and the family that is expressed in the pathos of Hector's encounter with Andromache and Astyanax in Book 6; cf. Seaford 1994: 336.

[32]Several passages in the poem show Polydamas' prudence and commitment to protecting the city in conflict with Hector's thoughtless and persistent impulse to fight. Inevitably, Polydamas' judgment proves sound, although Hector calls him a fool (νήπιος, *Il.* 18.295), while Homer, in an editorial comment (with a phrase reminiscent of *Il.* 6.234) rebukes the Trojans who would follow Hector, in his rash eagerness for battle, rather than the prudent counsel of Polydamas: ...ἐκ γάρ σφεων φρένας εἵλετο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη (*Il.* 18.311). In contrast to Homer's comment at *Il.* 6.234, the poet's censure of the Trojans in *Il.* 18 contains no irony.

(22.99–103). Yet even then he persists in ignoring the pleas of his family, this time those of Priam and his mother Hecuba (22.38–89), and reaffirms his quest for honor. He wishes to die in good repute (εὐκλεῖως, 22.110; cf. μὴ...ἀκλειῶς, 22.304). Once again Andromache reproaches Hector's motives, calling the force that drives him a "spirit that causes pain" (ἀγηνορίη ἀλεγεινή, 22.457).[33]

Homer does not question the value of honor in battle. Indeed, there is something of the poet's own thought expressed in Helen's words when she implies that the purpose of these events at Troy is to serve as matter for poetry (*Il.* 6.357–58).[34] What marks Hector's action as flawed is that, for him, honor gradually becomes a matter of status, divorced from the human ties that honorable actions ought to serve.[35] As Marilyn Arthur formulates the case, "Hector in his pride, and especially under the exhilarating influence of his *aristeia* in VIII and his triumph over Patroclus in XVI, gradually dissociates himself from the community of Troy which had earlier formed the basis for his heroic enterprise."[36]

As his quest for honor grows more obsessive, Hector becomes the inverse of Achilles in thematic terms. His increasing fixation on honor, despite the persistent impact of appeals from those closest to him, stands in contrast to Achilles' movement from a fixation on status to a realization of the primacy of his feeling for Patroclus.[37] Hector's love for both wife and son is clear; yet he does not base his actions on his affection. When Hector decides to reject Andromache's pleas in Book 6 that he remain near the city, he takes the first reluctant step in what becomes a more stark and less readily defensible

[33]ἀγηνορίη, "spirit," carries with it the connotation of excess.

[34]Arthur 32–33 properly observes that Andromache did not advise Hector against doing battle, and that, had Hector followed Andromache's advice, he would have elected to follow a more defensive strategy, but not played the part of a coward. To this Seaford 1994: 342 adds that Andromache's military advice may even have been the better practical strategy.

[35]Arthur 19–44 (see esp. 32–33, 37).

[36]Arthur 37.

[37]In Arthur's view, "a true resolution of the competing claims of *kleos* on the one hand, and *philia* ("love") and *eleos* on the other, is only achieved when the drama is played out entirely in the male domain, as it is after Book VI" (37). Achilles' love for Patroclus and his pity for Priam lead him, she adds, "to acknowledge the common bond of humanity which unites all men" (38).

preoccupation with honor in Books 18 and following.[38] It is Hector's self-absorbed quest for honor, no less than Agamemnon's shortsighted cruelty, that is, for a brief interlude, laid aside during the meeting of Diomedes and Glaucus in Book 6.

VI. The Exchange of Gold Armor for Bronze

With the thematic issues of the book in place, we may now return to the contrast between the rage associated with μαίνεσθαι and μανία and the other sort of madness characterized by the absence of φρένες. Recall that, when Diomedes and Glaucus renew their ancient ties of ξενία through an exchange of armor, the exchange is uneven because Glaucus gives Diomedes gold armor for bronze. The eccentricity of this gesture is so extreme that it evokes editorial surprise from Homer, who surmises that Zeus must have taken away Glaucus' wits: ἔνθ' αὖτε Γλαύκῳ Κρονίδης φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεύς... (*Il.* 6.234).

Modern commentators have been unable to agree about what motivates Zeus to afflict Glaucus in this way. Some argue that Glaucus in one way or another shows a flawed judgment in his failure to accord gold its proper value; he is either cowardly or stunned.[39] Others simply focus on the justice of Diomedes' material success. I submit rather that Glaucus is not flawed, nor does the exchange compensate him for losing his chance to score another conquest by defeating Glaucus.[40] In contrast to the τιμή and γέρας, the status and tokens of honor, over which Agamemnon and Achilles had quarreled in the opening book, Glaucus and Diomedes have reestablished a value system that makes status, and the material objects that symbolize status, secondary to—and a corollary of—the more fundamental ties of guest-friendship. The terms τιμή and γέρας are in fact as absent from Book 6[41] as are the gods themselves.

[38]I owe particular thanks to Marilyn Skinner and the anonymous referees of *TAPA* for leading me to acknowledge this distinction between the mentality of Hector in Book 6 and in Books 18–22.

[39]See esp. Craig and Andersen.

[40]Wilcock 141–54 sees Homer's assertion that Glaucus is mad as an endorsement of materialism (cf. Seaford 1994: 15 n. 61); Craig 243–45 finds the exchange a fair price for a hasty retreat. Anderson 106 sees it as "momentary foolishness resulting from relief." Calder 31–35 argues that Glaucus outgave Diomedes intentionally to show his superiority.

[41]In *Il.*1, words on the τιμ- root (including those in alpha-privative) occur six times, at least once in reference to each of the disputants; γέρας occurs thirteen times (ἀγέραστος once). Traill 301–5 suggests that heroes who are cheated of their due honor by divine intervention receive a "compensatory τιμή." So, he reasons, Diomedes gets gold for bronze in lieu of the

Homer opens Book 6 with an explicit statement of this fact: "and the deadly strife of the Trojans and the Achaians [is] left to itself (οἰώθη, *Il.* 6.1).[42] Athena, who enables Diomedes to know immortal from mortal and god from god in *Iliad* 5, leaves him in Book 6 and thus compels him to discover for himself whether Glaucus is a deity. Indeed, Diomedes in Book 5 drives Ares and Aphrodite, the deities of single-minded martial prowess and erotic passion, from the field. The only divine presence in *Iliad* 6 comes in the form of stories about gods—explicitly human constructs—the alleged intervention of Zeus in the exchange of armor and the parts played by the gods in Diomedes' story of Dionysus and in Glaucus' story of Bellerophon. It is as though Homer, in the character of Diomedes, were contriving to make a place in Book 6 for an alternative ethic, an ethic grounded in neither the blind slaughter of Ares nor the erotic character that led Paris, with Aphrodite's help, to disregard the laws of guest-friendship. In place of the passions inspired by gods or elicited by direct divine intervention, Diomedes and Glaucus affirm the entirely human construction of ξενία. Thus, when Glaucus gives his gold armor to Diomedes, he is witless only in the sense that he fails to respect the prevalent values of material wealth, the status which such wealth represents, and the excess of those pursuits when such divinities as Ares and Aphrodite inspire them.

Gold armor stands for all that Diomedes and Glaucus have set aside in Book 6. Armor is the prize of victory universally respected as the currency of heroic prowess, but gold armor carries special significance, for it links men and gods. Gold is the material substance most esteemed among mortals and most frequently used as an attribute of divinity. It is a standard currency of exchange between Olympus and the mortal sphere. The material value of gold, so frequently associated in the Homeric poems with divinity or with preeminent qualities in mortals, may also signal mortal excess. Examples of gold as a mark of preeminence might include Agamemnon's gold-studded staff, which proves his descent from Zeus and constitutes his claim to divine authority;[43] the gold staves sometimes carried by priests; and the offerings to gods that are

honor he would have gained had he slain Glaucus. The difficulty with Traill's conclusion lies in the fact that, if τιμή were a theme of *Il.* 6, one would expect the term to occur there, which it does not; contrast *Il.* 1, where τιμή is thematically central.

[42]The rarity of the verb οἰόειν (it occurs only in one other place in the Homeric epics, at *Il.* 11.401) makes the statement all the more emphatic.

[43]*Il.* 1.245–46, 279; 15.374.

occasionally marked by gold.[44] On the other hand, the gold armor that Hephaestus makes for Achilles becomes the emblem of Achilles' dehumanizing quest for divinity. His great shield is heavily ornamented in gold, and the formidable helmet is crowned in a gold crest and plumes.[45] This armor, reinforced by Zeus' watchful intervention, repels even the mightiest weapons and the deadliest aim of Achilles' enemies.[46] Yet the price of this god-like invulnerability seems to be some diminishing of the quality of life itself. Hephaestus' workshop is populated with mere semblances of life, life-like automatons made of gold, cauldrons with wheels that roll forth at their creator's command, and golden handmaidens that wait upon Hephaestus and his guest.[47] From the moment he puts on Hephaestus' armor and reenters the battle to avenge Patroclus, Achilles seems no more alive than Hephaestus' life-like contrivances.[48] Tortured with grief over the death of Patroclus, he is described not so much as a mourner but rather as a corpse, and even his ability to kindle the funeral pyre seems to depend on divine agency—just as his life depends upon the divine strength of Hephaestus' armor.[49] Indeed, because his authority is insupportable in terms of human justice, even Agamemnon's golden staff is deemed merely a dead tree limb and dashed to the ground by Achilles (*Il.* 1.234–46). The golden gifts of the gods and the competition for gold among men seem to come at a price.

If gold in *Iliad* 6 carries the connotation not merely of god-like stature but also of an extended sense of overriding mortal aspiration, then it may be clearer why the value of gold seems forgotten as personal ambition is set aside in favor of the ties that bind men together. In a book from which the gods are absent, Glaucus' lack of regard for his own golden armor suggests that Glaucus and, implicitly, Diomedes as well have put aside the quest for immortal fame that motivates Hector. For Diomedes and Glaucus, the material wealth and social

[44] *Il.* 15.374 and 24.285; *Il.* 10.294; and *Il.* 11.774, 23.196, 219.

[45] *Il.* 18.475–612; cf. *Il.* 19.383 and 22.312–20; *Il.* 20.268, 272 and 21.165.

[46] *Il.* 22.289–91.

[47] *Il.* 18.375, 418.

[48] Benardete 1955: 174–75 (= Benardete [Summer 1985]: 103) argues that Achilles' new armor, crafted in the workshop of Hephaestus, does not enhance the heroic stature of Achilles but in fact confirms his powerlessness. Benardete compares Achilles in his new armor to Hephaestus' golden hounds (presumably those he made for Alcinous, the Phaiacian); Hephaestus might be associated more immediately, however, with the golden servants that populate Hephaestus' workshop in *Il.* 18.

[49] Benardete 1955: 172–73 and 194–97 (= Benardete [Summer 1985]: 103 and 108).

status for which Achilles, Agamemnon, and even Hector are striving[50] have, for the moment, lost their significance.[51]

Summary and Conclusion

In conclusion, then, *Iliad* 6 counterpoises two contrasting states of mind. On the one hand, the divinely inspired rage of μανία leads mortals to destruction. Such μανία is seen in warriors whose aspirations are more than mortal and in women whose passion has reached a state of helpless, if not illicit, desperation. On the other hand, the absence of mind, φρένες, that leaves Glaucus in *Iliad* 6 in a seeming state of diminished mental power makes men not more menacing or destructive, but more vulnerable. The cautionary tale of Dionysus and Lycurgus illustrates the dangers of μανία as Lycurgus attacks the infant god, suggesting implicitly that μανία is Lycurgus' destructive rage, and that Dionysus, the god of madness (μαινομένοιο), is its source. The blindness Lycurgus suffers as a

[50]Strictly speaking, Hector's status is not embodied in material form. Andromache is not presented as a mark of status, nor does Hector fight explicitly for a portion of the spoils. Nevertheless, as I have argued earlier, Hector's ambition is materially represented in his gleaming armor.

[51]In his study of the Diomedes and Glaucus episode, Donlan 1–15 argues that the exchange is a gesture of submission on the part of Glaucus, that such a gesture is the Homeric norm in situations of guest-friendship exchanges (equity would eventually be restored by another unequal exchange in favor of the presently disadvantaged recipient), but that in the Glaucus-Diomedes episode, Glaucus was victimized by "Diomedes' cunning manipulation of his psychological advantage." Glaucus was "unprepared," says Donlan, "affected by Diomedes' aura of invincibility, conditioned by Diomedes' statement that Bellerophon had given gold to Oeneus [in exchange for a leather belt, and] anxious to please his new ξεῖνος...." As a result, he concludes, "Glaucus reacts in confusion...[φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεύς, 6.234] and makes a face-losing exchange" (13–14). This thesis founders, however, on its reading of Diomedes, who is not otherwise portrayed as an Odyssean figure of "cunning manipulation," and who does not (*pace* Donlan 13) retain either his ability to recognize gods or his license to attack them. In this connection, it may be noted that in the famous *Doloneia* of *Il.* 10, Odysseus is the planner and Diomedes the doer. Odysseus' epithets are πολυμήχανος (*Il.* 10.144) and πολύμητις (*Il.* 10.382, 400, 423, 554), while Diomedes' are Τυδείδην (*Il.* 10.150), βοὴν ἀγαθὸς (*Il.* 10.219, 383), and κρατερὸς (369, 446, 536). Odysseus is marked out for his surpassing mental skill (*Il.* 10.247); he lays the plans for the capture of Dolon (*Il.* 10.340–48); and it is he who questions the prisoner. Diomedes deals Dolon the mortal blow (*Il.* 10.454–57). In the camp of the Trojan Rhesus, Diomedes, not Odysseus, does the fighting (*Il.* 10.482–502; the division of labor is explicitly discussed in this passage), and Athena twice enhances Diomedes' physical strength (*Il.* 10.366–68; 482).

prelude to his death (*Il.* 6.139) is an emblem of the blind rage (μανία) that dictated his actions.[52]

In attacking a child, Dionysus, the king is blind to the unseen power of kinship that protects his victim. Unlike the Trojans who will perish in their mothers' wombs, the young Trojan Adrastus, who dies at Menelaus' hands, and Hector's son, who will die before he reaches manhood, Dionysus is delivered by the power of his father and the other Olympians. Lycurgus fails to perceive that the power of ξενία, grounded as it is in the vulnerability of the human condition, is mightier than raw force. When Diomedes and Glaucus renew ancient ties of ξενία, Diomedes is guided by a prudence that Lycurgus lacks. Diomedes is no less a man of action than Agamemnon, nor is he less moved by honor than Hector, but he is set apart by the fact that his mental state and sense of compassion remain intact. He is differentiated from the others because he honors ξενία and, implicitly, the sense of mortal vulnerability upon which ξενία is grounded. Diomedes' prudence, revealed here and elsewhere in the epic, complements Glaucus' apparent loss of wits as he fails to give gold its usual value. Taken together, such prudence or caution and such loss of wits are mental states that cooperate in removing Diomedes and Glaucus from the μανία about them. Dionysus thus becomes not the brutal force that Diomedes' mythic tale at first seems to invoke but rather the image of a very particular god whose power is ironically a function of vulnerability, and whose encounter with Lycurgus guides Diomedes and Glaucus to a sort of madness that is in fact sanity.[53] In George Bernard Shaw's words, "The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to

[52]Inability to recognize the divinity of Dionysus is a consistent failing in the god's later antagonists. In Euripides' *Bacchae* he arrives at Thebes in disguise (μορφὴν δ' ἀμείψας ἐκ θεοῦ βροτησίαν πάρειμι, "having changed form from that of a god, am I present among mortals," 4–5), but, as the god himself tells the young king, Pentheus has recognized Dionysus' divinity only too late (ὄψ' ἐμάθεθ' ἡμᾶς, ὅτε δ' ἐχρῆν, οὐκ ᾔδετε, "you have recognized me too late, but when it was necessary, you did not know [me]," 1345. Cf. 923–24: ὁ θεὸς ὁμαρτεῖ, πρόσθεν ὢν οὐκ εὐμενής, ἔνσπονδος ἡμῖν· νῦν δ' ὁρᾷς ἃ χρή σ' ὁρᾶν, "the god, who was before ill disposed, (now) attends us as an ally; and you now see what you must see." The pirates who abduct Dionysus at sea mistake their immortal captive for "a youth in the first blush of manhood" (νεηνίῃ ἀνδρὶ ἐοικώς πρωθήβῃ, *hBacch.* 7.3–4), and, in Sophocles' account of the madness of Lycurgus, the king comes to recognize only too late that he has attacked a god—the text, *Ant.* 959–61, is quoted above, p. 8.

[53]This view of Dionysian madness as a mechanism for the restoration of sanity is, of course, not a new one; see, e.g., Segal 1982: *passim.*

himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man."[54] While Lycurgus fails to look beyond appearances for the dangerous presence of a divinity and to recognize that in the apparent weakness of Dionysus there resides the extraordinary power of his Olympian kin, the ability of Diomedes and Glaucus to effect a mental shift points the way to a resolution of the bloody conflict in which they are engaged.

In sum, Glaucus' loss of φρένες does not result in clouded vision, but rather satisfies the conditions for altered vision. μανία is the destructive passion of excess, while loss of φρένες may sometimes be little more than an explanation for poor judgment. In *Iliad* 6, however, Glaucus' seeming failure of judgment, described as a loss of φρένες, in fact defines a flaw in the normative standards. When Homer questions Glaucus' judgment, he speaks in apparent agreement with the operative norms. Yet the poet's voice, with its exceptional editorial intervention, gives his words special emphasis and compels us to award them a second thought.

[54]Shaw 225.

Works Cited

Anderson, O. 1978. *Die Diomedesgestalt in der Ilias*. Oslo.

Arthur, M. 1981. "The Divided World of *Iliad* VI." In H. Foley, ed., *Reflections of Women in Antiquity*. New York. 19–44.

Benardete, S. 1955. "Achilles and Hector: the Homeric Hero." Diss. Chicago. Reprinted in *The St. John's Review*. Spring 1985: 31–58; Summer 1985: 85–114.

Burkert, W. 1985. *Greek Religion*. Cambridge, MA.

Calder, W. M. III. 1984. "Gold for Bronze: *Iliad* 6.232–36." In K. J. Rigsby, ed., *Studies Presented to Sterling Dow*. *GRBS* supplement 10. Durham, NC. 31–35.

Carpenter, T. H. 1993. "The Beardless Dionysus." In T. Carpenter and C. Faraone, eds., *The Masks of Dionysus*. Ithaka. 185–206.

———. 1997. *Dionysian Imagery in Fifth Century Athens*. Oxford.

Craig, J. D. 1967. "ΧΡΥΣΕΑ ΧΑΛΚΕΙΩΝ." *CR* n.s. 17.3: 243–45.

Deutsch, H. 1969. *A Psychoanalytic Study of the Myth of Dionysus and Apollo*. New York.

Donlan, W. 1989. "The Unequal Exchange Between Glaucus and Diomedes in Light of the Homeric Gift-Economy." *Phoenix* 43: 1–15.

Doyle, R. 1984. Ἄτη: *Its Use and Meaning*. New York.

Edwards, M. 1987. *Homer: Poet of the* Iliad. Baltimore and London.

———. 1991. *The Iliad: A Commentary*. Volume V: Books 17–20. Cambridge *et al.*

Finley, M. 1965. *The World of Odysseus*. 2nd ed. New York.

Gaisser, J. H. 1969. "Adaptation of Traditional Material in the Glaucus-Diomedes Episode." *TAPA* 100: 165–76.

Guthrie, W. K. C. 1955. *The Greeks and Their Gods*. Boston.

Harries, B. 1993. "'Strange Meeting': Diomedes and Glaucus in *Iliad* 6." *G&R* 40.2: 133–46.

Henrichs, A. 1994. "Der rasende Gött: Zur Psychologie des Dionysus und des Dionysischen in Myth und Literature." *Antike und Abendland* 40: 31–58.

Jebb, R. 1928. *Sophocles, The Plays and Fragments*. Part III, the *Antigone*. Rpt. of the 3rd ed., 1900. Cambridge.

Kamerbeek, J. C. 1978. *The Plays of Sophocles*. Commentaries, Part III, the *Antigone*. Leiden.

Lee, M. O. 1979. *Fathers and Sons in Virgil's* Aeneid: Tum Genitor Natum. Albany, NY.

Lloyd-Jones, H., ed. 1994. *Sophocles*. Loeb ed. Cambridge, MA.

Lowry, E. R., Jr. 1995. "Glaucus, The Leaves, and the Heroic Boast of *Iliad* 6." In J. Carter and S. Morris, eds., *The Ages of Homer: A Tribute to Emily Townsend Vermeule*. Austin, TX.

Merkelbach, R. and M. L. West, eds. 1967. *Fragmenta Hesiodea*. Oxford.

Meullner, L. 1976. *The Meaning of Homeric* ΕΥΧΟΜΑΙ *Through Its Formulas*. Innsbruck.

Nagy, G. 1979. *The Best of the Achaeans*. Baltimore.

Onians, R. B. 1954. *Origins of European Thought*. 2nd ed. Cambridge.

Otto, W. F. 1965. *Dionysus, Myth and Cult*. Bloomington and London.

Owen, E. T. 1946. *The Story of the* Iliad. Toronto and Vancouver.

Privitera, A. 1970. *Dioniso in Omero e nella poesia greca archaica*. Rome.

Redfield, J. 1993 [1975]. *Nature and Culture in the* Iliad: *the Tragedy of Hector*. Expanded ed. Chicago.

Robertson, M. 1992. *The Art of Vase-Painting in Classical Athens*. Cambridge.

Schaus, G. 1986. "Gold or Clay? Dionysus' Amphora on the Francois Vase." *EMC/CV* 30 n.s. 5: 119–28.

Scodel, R. 1992. "The Wits of Glaucus." *TAPA* 122: 73–84.

Seaford, R. 1993. "Dionysus as Destroyer of the Household: Homer, Tragedy, and the Polis." In T. Carpenter and C. Faraone, eds., *The Masks of Dionysus*. Ithaka. 115–46.

———. 1994. *Reciprocity and Ritual: Homer and Tragedy in the Developing City-State*. Oxford.

Segal, C. 1971. "Andromache's *Anagnorisis*: Formulaic Artistry in *Iliad* 22.437–476." *HSCP* 75: 33–57.

———. 1982. *Dionysiac Poetics and Euripides' "Bacchae."* Princeton.

Shaw, G. B. 1930. "Maxims for Revolutionists." In A. St. Lawrence, ed., *The Collected Works of Bernard Shaw*. Vol. X. London. 217–29.

Sider, D. 1996. "As Is the Generation of Leaves in Homer, Simonides, Horace, and Stobaios." *Arethusa* 29.2: 263–82.

Traill, D. 1989. "Gold Armor for Bronze and Homer's Use of Compensatory τιμή." *CP* 84: 301–5.

West, M. L. 1992. *Iambi et Elegi Graeci*. Vol. II. 2nd ed. Oxford.

Wilcock, M. M. 1964. "Mythological Paradeigma in the *Iliad*." *CQ* 14: 141–54.

Wyatt, W. 1982. "Homeric ἄτη." *AJP* 103: 247–76.